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IN THE 
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IN THE 
S U P R E M E C 0 U R T 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
McEWEN IRRIGATION COMPANY, ) 
aka McEWAN DITCH COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent,) 
vs. ) 
NORMAND MICHAUD, aks ) 
NORMAND P. MICHAUD, aka 
BUD N. MICHAUD, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
Case No. 14601 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was an action commenced by the Plaintiff (Respondent 
herein) to compel the Defendant (Appellant herein) to remove 
a bridge he had installed across an irrigation ditch claimed 
by the Respondent, on the Appellant's land, and for damages. 
The matter was before the Court on Respondent's order to 
show cause. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered Findings of Fact and Order on 
Respondent's Order to Show cause. The Order permitted 
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Respondent to remove the bridge, provided that its agents 
exercise due care and diligence not to excessively damage 
the bridge or any other property of Appellant. The Order 
reserved ruling on all other issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent has substantial disagreements with Appel-
lant's Statement of Facts. Therefore, Respondent will set 
forth hereunder a Statement of Facts, showing therein the 
disagreements with Appellant's statement. 
The Appellant purchased a small tract of land north of 
Panguitch, Garfield County, Utah, in the summer of 1975. 
The parcel had been unoccupied for a least ten (10) years, 
although there was a dilapidated frame home located thereon. 
(T page 23, line 14.) The Appellant had moved a trailer 
home on the parcel for his own use and a second trailer home 
for the use and occupation of his elderly mother. 
The property acquired by the Defendant was traversed by 
a ditch, which was claimed by the Respondent company. The 
ditch cut diagonally through the property, making it necessary 
to cross the ditch for access from the road to Panguitch, 
Utah, to Appellant's home. The ditch is owned by the Respondent 
and has been used for at least thirty (30) years to convey 
Respondent's decreed water right out of the South Fork of 
the Sevier River onto farmland of Respondent's stockholders. 
Respondent has a decreed water right as follows: (1) Primary 
rights, 16.10 c.f.s., period of use, March 15th to November 
15th; and 6.01 c.f.s., period of use, November 15th to March 
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15th; (2) third-class rights, 5 68 c f · d f 
. . .s., per1o o use, 
March 15th to November 15th. The winter primary right is 
not presently being used. This statement as to the use of 
the ditch is at substantial variance with Appellant's statement 
that the ditch is used only to collect Spring run-off water. 
There is no evidence to show that Appellant wrote a 
letter to Respondent in the Fall of 1975 advising Respondent 
of the necessity of a bridge. The Defendant merely cut down 
the ditch banks and caused a bridge to be constructed from 
large pine poles and bridge timber and placed over the 
ditch. This paragrpah is at variance with Appellant's 
corresponding statement. 
Appellant's statement alleges that Respondent began 
cleaning the ditch in early 1976. The evidence shows that 
ditch cleaning operations were accomplished in November, 
1975. (T page 20, lines 28-30.) The ditch was cleaned by 
use of a bulldozer. The ditch was cleaned up to the bridge 
where the bulldozer was removed from the ditch and resumed 
cleaning on the opposite side. The area near and under the 
bridge was not cleaned, pending the outcome of negotiations 
between the parties regarding the placement of the bridge. 
The negotiations were unsuccessful, and the Respondent 
filed suit to compel the Appellant to remove the bridge and 
for damages. The complaint also requested an order to show 
cause requiring the Defendant to appear before the Court to 
show cause why an immediate order should not be entered 
permitting the Respondent to remove the bridge in advance of 
-3-
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trial on the basis that the bridge constituted an obstruction 
in the ditch. 
The files and records will show that an order to show 
cause was issued by the Judge but was never personally 
served on the Appellant. The record will also show that the 
Appellant was not served personally with a copy of the 
summon~ and complaint, but that the same were served on the 
Appellant's mother, who lives in a trailer home on Appellant's 
property. The summons and complaint were served on the 29th 
day of April, 1976, but the Deputy Sheriff for Garfield 
County testified that by reason that he knew that an order 
to show cause had to be served personally on the Appellant, 
it was not served with the summons and complaint at that 
time. The testimony of the Deputy Sheriff also shows that 
the Garfield County Sheriff and Appellant's mother had a 
conversation regarding the matter on April 29, 1976. The 
Sheriff had the summons, complaint and order to show cause 
in his possession, ready to be served, at that time. 
On Tuesday, the 4th day of May, 1976, the Appellant 
contacted Robert L. Gardner, Attorney at Law, relative to 
respresenting him in the action. On that same date, Robert 
L. Gardner contacted David Mower, Attorney for Respondent, 
in an effort to resolve the matter by way of settlement, if 
possible. During that conversation, Mr. Gardner was informed 
by Mr. Mower that the matter would appear on the Garfield 
County Law and Motion calendar on Thursday the 6th day of 
May, 1976, for a hearing on the order to show cause. After 
-4-
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some discussion, it was agreed that a settlement could 
probably be worked out. The attorneys were to discuss the 
matter with their respective clients, looking toward the 
execution of a stipulation on May 6, 1976, and an order of 
dismissal from the Court. 
On the Thursday the 6th day of May, 1976, the attorneys 
met. Attorney Mower advised Attorney Gardner that it would 
be impossible to agree to the terms previously discussed 
over the telephone on May 4, 1976. The matter was on the 
Law and Motion calendar to be heard on the order to show 
cause. Attorney Mower, approximately five (5) minutes 
before the calendar was called, caused a copy of the order 
to show cause to be delivered to Attorney Gardner. As the 
matter was called by the court approximately thirty (30) 
minutes later, Attorney Gardner advised the court that since 
his client had not been served with the order to show cause 
and in view of the fact that Attorney Gardner assumed the 
matter had been settled, the Defendant was neither ready nor 
prepared to proceed with the hearing at that time but did 
agree to meet at anytime after the Appellant had a reasonable 
opportunity to prepare. The court originally acknowledged 
the fact that it did not have jurisdiction to proceed in the 
matter by reason of lack of service. (T page 3, lines 19-
20.) Thereafter, the court asked if the Defendant was in 
the courthouse, and upon being advised that he was, the 
court requested that the Appellant be contacted to see about 
proceeding immediately. Appellant's attorney again objected 
-5-
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by reason of the court not having jurisdiction to hear the 
matter by reason of lack of service of process and adequate 
notice. 
When the matter was recalled later on the calendar, 
Attorney Gardner again advised the court that his client was 
not ready to proceed at that time; that the court had no 
jurisdiction to consider the matter; and further that based 
upon information that the Attorney had just been given by 
the Appellant concerning some past differences between the 
Judge and the Appellant, that the Court should disqualify 
itself in the matter. 
The court thereupon ordered the Plaintiff to proceed on 
the order to show cause and further ordered the Attorney for 
the Appellant to remain in the courtroom during the hearing 
although the court had been advised that the Appellant was 
not prepared to participate nor did Appellant intend to 
participate. 
The Respondent called as its first witness Deputy 
Sheriff Jackson, who testified concerning the service of 
process on the Appellant, as there was no Return of Service 
on any of the papers in the file. The Deputy testified in 
substance that a copy of the summons and complaint had been 
served on Mrs. Presley, mother of Appellant, on the 29th day 
of April, 1976, but that he specifically recalled that the 
order to show cause had not been served, as it was his 
understanding that the order had to be served personally. 
He further testified that to his knowledge the Appellant had 
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never been served with the order to show cause up to that 
time. 
The court then took testimony from Mr. Dale Gubler, 
representing the Respondent. The Appellant refused to enter 
the courtroom, despite several requests. At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the court entered an order authorizing the 
removal of the bridge without providing access in any fashion 
for the Appellant to that portion of his property on the 
other side of the ditch. The court ordered findings of fact 
entered, which, among other things, were to include a finding 
that the Appellant had acted maliciously and wilfully. 
The Respondent thereafter removed the bridge. 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT'S POINT I 
THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE MATTER REQUESTED 
BY THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE BY REASON OF LACK OF PROPER 
SERVICE AND NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT. 
Appellant contends that Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires personal service upon a p~rty whose 
appearance is called for. Careful reading of Rule 5 (a) 
reveals no such requirement. On the contrary, Rules 4(e)&(f) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide means of substituted 
service, such as service upon a person of suitable age and 
discretion residing at the usual place of abode of the 
person to be served, or, service by publication. 
This, of course, is consistent with the doctrine which 
has come to be known as "procedural due process." Procedural 
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due process embodies the concepts of justice and fair play. 
The fundamental concepts of the doctrine are notice and 
opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the 
case. Montana State University v. Ransier, 536 P.2d 187, 
Mont. 1975. 
"Under the 'due process of law' mandate, no person can 
be affected by a hearing or an adjudication of court without 
his voluntary appearance or service of process affording 
opportunity to appear and contest the claim against him." 
Dillard v. McKnight, 209 P.2d 387, 34 C.2d 209, Calif., 
emphasis added. 
The evidence in this case shows that the Appellant 
probably received notice of the order to show cause and the 
hearing thereon on the 29th day of April, 1976. That was 
the date the Sheriff went to serve the papers and had a 
conversation with the Appellant's mother, upon whom the 
summons and complaint were served. The conclusion that the 
Appellant probably knew of the hearing date is made certain 
by his voluntary appearance in the courthouse on the hearing 
date. That the Appellant would not come into the courtroom 
is of no consequence, since he had the opportunity to do so. 
APPELLANT'S POINT II 
THE JUDGE, BASED UPON HIS PAST INVOLVEMENT WITH THE 
DEFENDANT, SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED HIMSELF FROM THE 
MATTER WHEN REQUESTED TO DO SO BY APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY. 
Respondent recognizes the fact that the Appellant has 
had previous confrontations with the Judge. The Appellant 
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is in the habit of preparing his own pleadings, not in 
proper form, which are sent to the county clerk, without 
filing fees. Appellant's letters to the President of the 
United States, the F.B.I., the U.S. Justice Department, the 
President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
and many others, have gained some notoriety in the State. 
Most of these letters and purported pleadings have been 
uncomplimentary to the Judge -- in fact, they have been 
uncomplimentary to everyone else in the world other than the 
Appellant. 
All must learn to deal with recalcitrant and litigious 
individuals. The fact that one might be upset by the actions 
of such an individual does not necessarily lead to a conclusiou 
of bias or prejudice. 
The evidence shows that the Judge was fair and that he 
acted in reaction to his knowledge of this Appellant as well 
as his knowledge of the difficulty for litigants in Garfield 
County to obtain a hearing of an urgent matter. The Judge is 
the lone Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, which comprises 
seven (7) counties. On the 6th day of May, 1976, the Judge 
was in Panguitch, Garfield County, for his once a month Law 
and Motion day. The next most accessible Judges would be in 
either the Fourth or the Fifth Judicial Districts. The 
Judge of the Fifth District is a lone Judge for four (4) 
counties. A Judge from the Fourth District would have to 
travel at least two hundred (200) miles for a hearing in 
Garfield County. 
-9-
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The Judge in this case ruled in the only practical 
manner, and in fairness to all parties concerned. 
CONCLUSION 
The court did have jurisdiction to hold a hearing on 
the order to show cause. Appellant received actual notice 
of the hearing and appeared voluntarily at the courthouse on 
the hearing date. Appellant's counsel received notice of 
the hearing two (2) days prior to the hearing date. 
The Judge made a ruling dictated by the practicalities 
and exigencies of the circumstances. The Judge was aware of 
his duties to both treat litigants fairly and reach a decision. 
The rulings in the case thus far should be uph~ld, and 
the case remanded for further proceedings. 
-10-
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. MOWER 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, UT 84759 
Attorney for Respondent 
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